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Abstract: This article examines what is called the ‘caring organization’ out of the work of French philosopher Jean-Luc 
Nancy. Starting from two tales from Kafka and Borges, it analyzes Nancy’s concept of community and singularity and 
their potential relevance for the area of social sciences. Thinking an organization from the perspective of singularity 
means that we no longer think in terms of an unchangeable essence. Nancy’s notion of the singular goes the other way 
round: organizations are able to function because they differ from themselves and change all the time. An organization is 
but its components with their singular traits at every moment and these traits produce a singularized and thus 
necessarily temporary collective. As long as we start from identity as a substantial given, an unfruitful opposition is at 
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on the contrary, does not start from an opposition of two identities but from identities differing from themselves because 
they are understood as singular, changing entities; their singular characteristics potentially modify the whole as such.  
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1. TWO SHORT STORIES 
This article obtains a discussion on the aspects of 
singularity and responsibility in what is called the 
‘caring organization’ (N. Anderson & Hughes Karen, 
2010; Campbell, 2011; Forte, 2004; French & Weis, 
2000). A caring organization is what the word says it is: 
an organization that takes care for its employees. 
Though embedded in the literature on caring 
organizations, I will analyze this subject out of the work 
of French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. 
To introduce what is at stake in Nancy’s work and 
how it can be relevant to the area of business ethics, 
we will start with two short stories from two great and 
well known novelists, namely Franz Kafka on the one 
hand and Jorge Luis Borges on the other hand. We will 
use their stories as metaphors to introduce the topics 
we want to discuss.  
First of all, a story from Borges. In The Analytical 
Language of John Wilkins (El idioma analítico de John 
Wilkins), Borges describes “a certain Chinese 
encyclopedia,” the so called Celestial Emporium of 
Benevolent Knowledge, in which a classification of 
animals is given (Borges, 1984). The animals are 
divided into: 
1. those that belong to the Emperor, 
2. embalmed ones, 
3. those that are trained, 
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4. suckling pigs, 
5. mermaids, 
6. fabulous ones, 
7. stray dogs, 
8. those included in the present classification, 
9. those that tremble as if they were mad, 
10. innumerable ones, 
11. those drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, 
12. others, 
13. those that have just broken a flower vase, 
14. those that from a long way off look like flies. 
Obviously, in his text Borges laughs at scientific 
classification systems or taxonomies: every 
classification seems to include its own failure, Borges 
suggests, as animals can always be divided in all sorts 
of classes. Since the division of animals Borges writes 
about can only be called ridiculous, it is a metaphor to 
mock with the idea of the possibility to classify as such. 
We won’t discuss this right now but will come back to 
this and apply it to the topic of the caring organization.  
Secondly, we would like to discuss a short story 
from Franz Kafka. A very short story it is, and Max 
Brod, who edited Kafka’s work, entitled it posthumously 
as ‘Gemeinschaft’ - the English translation is entitled 
with ‘Fellowship’, a very questionable translation 
(Kafka, 1983). It is a story of no more than fifteen lines 
about five people living together in a house. They were 
five friends we are told, everything was fine, but then a 
sixth wanted to join in and he refused to budge. The 
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sixth came to disturb the party and throw the 
mathematics overboard. Although the friends wanted to 
include the sixth if the 5+1 would have become 5 
again, which means they would still be one community, 
a whole or a totality. Before the sixth arrived, the five 
were one, not because they really enjoyed each other 
but they were one because they lived together and 
therefore they are a community; the intruder came to 
turn this order upside down because the 5+1 isn’t 
actually 5 but 6 or even more than that.  
To summarize the story: we were with five friends, 
we once came out of a house and people said, look, 
these five came out of this house. Since then, we live 
together and all went well until a sixth arrived. As such, 
we don’t mind the sixth but the five of us are fine as it 
is; we don’t know him and we don’t want him. Although 
we don’t know each other as well, we are used to each 
other now and we don’t want to be six. Being with six 
doesn’t make sense but being with five neither, but yet, 
we are used to it and we don’t want a new community. 
We could make strong statements or detailed 
declarations but we won’t do that. We don’t declare 
anything. The sixth keeps on coming and although we 
push him away, he always returns. End of the story. 
As is the case with Borges’ celestial emporium, also 
Kafka’s short story obviously discusses the matter of 
belonging to, of being part of a group or a kind, of being 
included or excluded. While Borges explicitly mocks 
about the attempt to classify living beings of all kinds, 
Kafka discusses the mathematical order we are familiar 
with. Apparently, when it comes down to being 
together, mathematics comes in trouble. Many social 
scientists, sociologists or philosophers have claimed 
this in the past: people living together in a community 
generate a reality of which a total sum is always more 
than the parts of it (Lopez, 2003). Consequently, the 
question of living together is not a problem where 1 and 
1 is always 2. Kafka’s short story poses this problem in 
the starkest terms: 5+1 isn’t five and therefore, the 
sixth, the intruder by coincidence, is not allowed to 
enter the house, not because the five hate him but 
simply they are five and belong together and he’s not 
one of them. If 5+1 would have been 5, then it would 
have worked, but apparently 5+1 will even be more 
than 6.  
2. SINGULARITY  
Kafka’s and Borges’ tales expose a metaphysical 
problem we want to reveal throughout this article: the 
contingency of communities. The way five friends leave 
the house is quite everyday scenery. It could have 
been workers leaving their company by the end of the 
day. People come together, fall apart, make 
agreements, cross each other in the street, curse one 
another in traffic, etc. Of course, one shares more with 
certain others, and has more intense contact with this 
rather than that other; some might be completely alien 
to you while you cannot get enough of others. Not all 
experiences are equal, or even important, but all fall 
within the frame of what we could describe as everyday 
encounters.  
Kafka’s story is intriguing because the five also 
operate in this everyday mode, but nevertheless 
privilege one meeting so as to surmount the 
everydayness and attain an authentic existence. They 
exploit a banal meeting in order to set up a community 
to which only they belong, excluding everyone else. 
Despite their vague awareness that their community is 
nothing more than a banal meeting, they institute a 
communality where the shared experience of their 
contingent meeting undergoes a sort of process of 
concretization and seems to harden into an essence, a 
first cause or principle so as to overcome the order of 
contingency. They take this proclaimed essence so as 
to erect a barrier between themselves and others.  
What Kafka’s and Borges’ stories indicate so 
beautifully here is that this barrier is itself of the order of 
the contingent, so that the whole operation of marking 
out the community is supported a priori by a failure. 
Every community is also a contingent community but 
most often forgets this contingency in order to put up a 
barrier between the inside and the outside, between 
the members of the community and the intruders. Then 
community becomes an imaginary whole (B. Anderson, 
1999), an organic entity which seems to be natural in 
the way its barriers are installed.  
When thinking about an organization, this is an 
important topic. Although its etymology refers to ‘organ’ 
or ‘organic’ and therefore includes the suggestion of a 
‘natural belonging together’, most often an organization 
is a very contingent entity: people come and go, their 
origin and background is very diverse, as are their 
ethical values or cultural priorities; and most important, 
their belonging to the organization is only a part of their 
human being. Who they actually are, is quite a mystery 
since they are only partaking the organization because 
they want to or have to do their job.  
Maybe more than we could have imagined when we 
read the story, an organization has all characteristics of 
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Kafka’s five friends leaving their house: they are one 
but their being-one is highly contingent. More 
emphatically, only because others have said that these 
five came out of a house together they belong together 
as this five. Through this everyday meeting, they have 
been bound to one another although the meaning of it 
escapes them. Their togetherness thus rests on 
chance. They share experiences but apparently have 
nothing in common, no essence that binds or drives 
them together. Why this is, we do not know – how 
would it be any other way in Kafka– but the fact that 
they are together is something they certainly know well 
and it is precisely because they are together that they 
stay together. 
In Kafka’s tale the connection between the five 
people who left the house is profoundly contingent. It 
could just as easily have been a coming together of 
four people sitting in a waiting room, waiting for the 
doctor together. Nevertheless, the five subsequently 
forget this contingency and interpret their shared 
experience as a first cause. The contingent fact that 
they came out of a house together as five people 
becomes a necessity: they cannot be otherwise than 
five, they are these five and not six. Their shared 
experience is the basis for their continuing on like this. 
Without a clear ‘why’ at the foundation of their 
community, they themselves institute a form of 
causality: they must form a community, because they 
now share an experience. Their contingent experience 
is thus retroactively converted into the shared essence 
of (a) being together. 
This conversion cannot help but to seem ridiculous 
to the reader, even tragic through the very manner in 
which the close community of friends comes into being. 
We have no idea why they are together; they do not 
know each other but act as if they wanted to be 
together, as five and not as six. They act as if they are 
one, although they most certainly are not and they 
realize it doesn’t make sense; they only act as if they 
share an essence with each other, but no one 
apparently knows what to call this essence. Kafka not 
only nuances the difference between the inside and 
outside of a community, he ironizes the way a 
community shuts itself off in general. If a contingent 
shared experience can just as easily form the basis of 
(a) communality, what then does it mean for people to 
share an “essence” with each other? 
Must we conclude, then, with Kafka but also with 
Borges, that everything is contingent and relative? By 
no means. There are always communities to which 
some people belong and others do not. It is not that 
either there are substantial or strong communities or 
there are only unstructured meetings of individuals. It 
concerns rather the ways a community constitutes itself 
and on which basis. In Kafka’s and Borges’ short 
stories it becomes clear that the erection of a barrier, 
however contingent or capricious, always has a violent 
underside if one regards such a border as absolute and 
appropriates it as the sole authentic border. In such 
cases, the border or the limit becomes a dividing line 
between those who share the communal essence and 
those who do not. The limit is not only used to keep 
people out or refuse entry but also to align the 
members of the community to one another along an 
immanent axis.  
When we reflect upon the caring organization, as 
this article pretends to do, we think it is important to 
take our time to understand how we understand an 
organization in the line between mere individuals and a 
strong community: is an organization a community, is it 
a fluid entity (Bauman, 2000), is it a fragmented 
gathering of people, etc. (Ignaas Devisch, 2013; Ignaas 
Devisch & Francine, 2010; M. Heidegger, 1999; J.-L. 
Nancy, 2008, 2010; Rajchman, 1995; Ten Bos, 2005; 
Verhaeghe, 2014)? 
3. COMMUNITY  
Someone who profoundly thought about the 
importance of community in our contemporary world is 
French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy. Community, he 
keeps on repeating, is one of the major problems of our 
era. Why indeed do we have to think community today, 
also during a conference on organization and care? 
The most obvious answer Nancy would give to the 
question is undoubtedly: because community is a 
problem today which also affects every kind of formal 
organization (J. L. Nancy, 1991, 1992a, 1999a, 2003). 
It sounds rather banal to say we have to deal with 
something because it is a problem, but the question if 
of course why today community is a problem or at least 
a question and why we cannot but deal with it. (J. L. 
Nancy, 1991). There were times where it was self-
evident who belonged to the community and who 
didn’t, you were simply born in it. You were inside or 
outside of the house. Community then could not be a 
problem because the question of what it means to be in 
common did not even arise (I. Devisch, 2010). Whether 
these periods were better, simpler or more rose-
colored is yet another but a very necessary question to 
all kinds or romantic nostalgia about a golden past; the 
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fact is that community has not always been under 
discussion. In some periods, community was simply 
there, as the foundation and final cause of existence 
and the being of community was a sufficient reason for 
living together in a community (J. L. Nancy, 1992a). 
Obviously today, this is not the case and one does 
not have to consult philosophical or ethical literature to 
see that community is indeed a problem, or at least is 
being conceived as problematic, and it is thus 
imperative to look for an answer to the problems that 
present themselves in thinking through our times 
(Macintyre, 1981). Since having clear insight into a 
problem is just as important as finding an answer, the 
question is: which problems are we dealing with in the 
context of community? The most basic and tautological 
answer is: the problem that we no longer know what we 
are talking about when we speak about community.  
Here, too, the triviality of this answer speaks 
volumes but again, this is to Nancy a crucial insight in 
nowadays’ society: the fact that we no longer know 
whether and how we can still speak about community, 
this is the fundamental challenge of community today. 
The most foundational evidence of a community – who 
belongs to it and why – is at loose ends and this is at 
least a challenge, not only to philosophy but to society 
as a whole (J.-L. Nancy & Richardson, 2000). If every 
barrier of a community is contingent – think about 
Borges: if every classification fails – then the 
fundamental question raises how to organize society, 
since we cannot simply pretend that we are one world 
community and then presuppose all of our problems to 
be solved.  
As far as Nancy concerns, we need new words and 
concepts to think our being together today, because 
the words by which we thought about community – 
community is all about sharing the same essence: a 
color, a race, a nature, a nationality or a culture – is 
being eroded by the way society has evolved 
(Collective, 1991). A variety of cultural, political and 
social developments have led to the disappearance of 
traditional social bonds. A quick recounting of these 
developments would include the economic reduction of 
the importance of the old nation states through the 
increasing significance of transnational and global 
economic and cultural organization, rapid urbanization, 
greater complexity in terms of social and institutional 
structures and the progressive disintegration of ancient 
social connections and traditions. These have all 
contributed to the appearance of new insecurities and 
an increasing precariousness of our situation, both at 
the individual level and in the field of the social. Such 
insecurities have troubling effects not only on a number 
of social and political structures but also on our 
personal identities. Consequently, one of the most 
important uncertainties of today’s society is that the 
traditional social bonds have dissolved and that we are 
confronted with the most basic questions. This is if 
course a golden age for philosophers who are most 
often fond of fundamental questions. So is Nancy. One 
of his major books on community is called Being 
singular plural (J.-L. Nancy & Richardson, 2000). He 
argues that there is no singularity which is not plural 
and, the other way round, that there is no plurality 
which is not singular. To translate this into layman’s 
terms: to be always implies to be more than one.  
To Nancy, the ‘more than one’ is crucial: being 
never means being-alone but always being-with (J.-L. 
Nancy, 2008). Although this idea seems the most banal 
one-liner since decades, it is crucial in many 
discussions on identity and community. It implies that 
every enclosure of a community will always also be 
disclosed or disturbed from outside because the criteria 
used to enclose it are contingent. There will always be 
a sixth.  
Nancy states that such insufficiency constitutes in 
principle every community. This must be regarded as 
fundamental, he concludes. The disclosure of a 
community is not derived from an originary or still-to-
be-constituted completeness nor from a lack that the 
community is designed to sublate (J. L. Nancy, 1999a). 
Rather, such incompleteness is something constitutive 
because we are, be it as an individual person or as a 
collective identity, always exposed to others. For 
Nancy, the incompleteness is never located in some 
sort of quest for a closed totality. Insufficiency never 
stands for a lack, but for something that fundamentally 
cannot be perfected or finished and therefore is 
constitutive for every community. In short, closure goes 
hand in hand with disclosure and this challenges 
profoundly our thinking of the identity of for instance 
organizations. In Kafka’s words: there is always a sixth. 
These dynamics will also have their influence within a 
rather formal gathering of people as organizations are: 
no matter how much rules and procedures we will 
develop, there will always be a sixth, within or outside 
the organization. We will come back to this.  
Next to the incompleteness, a second characteristic 
Nancy puts forward is what he calls the singular 
character of identities (J.-L. Nancy & Richardson, 
2000). Singularity is not an easy concept. It refers to 
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something that is rather ungraspable and unique, 
something hasty or fluid. These are, of course, no 
characteristics that will lead us towards a substance or 
essence of an organization. It rather appears to be the 
other way round: the lack of any essence seems to be 
the only essence of singularity (J. L. Nancy, 1992b). 
Singularity represents the idea of a temporal 
identity, a non-substantial given changing all the time 
while existence goes on. In yet another text of Nancy, 
The Experience of Freedom, we find an interesting 
passage that might help us to answer this question: 
“For us, existence is above all what is singular. It 
happens singularly and only singularly. As for the 
existence, its own existence is above all singular, which 
means that its existence is not precisely its ‘own’ and 
that its ‘existing’ happens an indefinite number of times 
‘in’ it’s very individuality (which is for its part a 
singularity). Singularity is what distinguishes the 
existent from the subject, for the subject is essentially 
what appropriates itself, according to its own proximity 
and law. Yet the advent of a subjectivity is itself a 
singularity” (J. L. Nancy, 1993, pp. 190-191n192). 
To accentuate the non-essential and temporary 
character of our identity as an individual or as part of a 
collective, not only Nancy but a lot of contemporary 
continental thinkers have used the notion of singularity. 
Many of them are or have been looking for a suitable 
concept to think identity in a non-substantial or non-
essential way. Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Derrida, and 
Gilles Deleuze, to mention just a few names, have tried 
to make progress in thinking our identity in this way 
(Agamben, 1990; Bertland, 2011; Derrida, 1988, 
1997a; Ignaas Devisch, 2012; Esposito, 2009; May, 
1997; Patton, 1996). Most of them have an almost 
inborn fear from the political, philosophical, and social 
claim that identity can be seen as something that one 
owns. This does not only hold for an individual essence 
but also, and perhaps more urgently, for essences that 
believed to be shared collectively. Twentieth century 
politics have shown all too clear where the claim on 
closed substantial identities might lead to. Therefore, 
all of the thinkers named (and others), want to undo the 
possibility of this claim by thinking identity or existence 
in another way, in order to prevent us from totalitarian 
thinking (Traverso, 2001). This is also why we started 
this paper with the two stories: they question the idea 
of a closed identity.  
While many thinkers put forward a strong individual 
identity against the risk of totalitarian collectivities, 
Nancy’s specific touch in this debate is the explicit 
relation he establishes between singularity and 
plurality. He argues that there is no singularity which is 
not plural and, the other way round, that there is no 
plurality which is not singular: being is always being-
with, singular is always singular plural, being one is 
always being more than one. The singularity is a 
plurality, with and between other singularities (which 
are, by the same token, also pluralities). Nancy speaks 
of the ‘singular plural in such a way as to make clear 
that singularity is inextricably bound up with plurality. 
Singularity is being-with-many (J.-L. Nancy, 2008; J.-L. 
Nancy & Richardson, 2000). 
To singularize oneself means to be exposed to 
others and to differ from others. The relation between 
singularities is their incommensurability. They can 
never be reduced to one another, but their mutual 
differences never boil down to substantial 
characteristics which can lead towards the closure of a 
collective of similar singularities. We are different from 
one another, but not out of a substance or archetype. 
Characteristics like ethnicity or culture are contingent, 
in a way that they are not the exclusive and substantial 
key terms to include or exclude a person to a certain 
community or organization. Admittedly, there are 
Germans and others who are not, there are laborers 
and others who are not, or there are Muslims and 
others who are not, but here Nancy crucially points out 
these people do not differ in a substantial way from the 
others since there is no infinite and everlasting native 
essence called ‘German’, ‘laborer’, or ‘Muslim’. 
Because of their singularisation, identities differ from 
themselves and can no longer be thought of as a 
substance to which one, depending on whether one 
shares the putative essence of the collective identity, 
belongs or not. Identities, be it collectives or 
individuals, are contingent in a way that they change 
with every singularization. Each time again, they are 
recomposed, rebuild, and modified. Not that they are 
just like anything or anyone else. They are a ‘self’ but 
this self is only in its respective singular moments each 
time again different from the other moments (J.-L. 
Nancy & Rand, 2008). 
Kafka’s story in which the five conceived 
themselves as one and the sixth represented their 
‘more than one’ reveals the starting point Nancy stands 
upon in his writings on community and singularity and 
the way he develops a new thought on individual or 
collective identity. Identity, he claims, is no vast and 
steady entity, grounding itself. Neither is a collective, 
thought out in terms of a substantial criterion that 
allegedly marks the frontier between inner and outer. 
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Both the individual and the collective exist in their 
respective singularization. They change all the time 
and so do their characteristics.  
Thinking this change is as such not innovative – of 
course, we change all the time – but it gets radicalized 
in Nancy’s thought. Nancy does not start with the 
essence of an identity which then is subject to some 
changes. It is just the other way round: identity is 
nothing but the gathering of singular differences, the 
infra-individual differences that make someone always 
plurally, locally and momentarily different.  
Existence is without essence and that is what 
Nancy’s singularity is all about. If we all are singular 
and thus plural, we neither do have an essence nor are 
we substantial individuals: “At this exact point, then, 
one becomes most aware of the essence of singularity: 
it is not individuality; it is, each time, the punctuality of a 
‘with’ that establishes a certain origin of meaning and 
connects it to an infinity of other possible origins. 
Therefore, it is, at one and the same time, infra-
/intraindividual and transindividual, and always the two 
together. The individual is an intersection of 
singularities, the discrete exposition of their 
simultaneity, an exposition that is both discrete and 
transitory” (J.-L. Nancy & Richardson, 2000, p. 85). 
Consequently, we do not differ just from others but 
we also differ continuously from ourselves. With a 
friend we behave differently than with family. In 
different contexts we can also behave differently 
toward the same person. People never meet person Y 
as such, but always person Y with specific infra-
individual qualities or characteristics. This is why 
people are not to be distinguished from each other on 
the basis of whether or not they share a common 
denominator. There are no archetypal points of 
comparison or one or another essence against which 
each character trait can be measured. The smile of an 
African girl does not typify the girl on the basis of some 
substantial characteristics of either being black or 
African. The smile typifies the girl at that moment, at 
that fleeting moment at which she laughs. Each new 
situation brings another smile (or tear) and thus 
another origin or singular moment (J.-L. Nancy & Rand, 
2008). 
4. WHAT ABOUT AN ORGANIZATION?  
What can this possibly mean for an organization? 
An organization, as is often pretended in commercials 
or baselines, would have a kind of fixed identity, a set 
of essential characteristics that we might refer to as the 
organization culture, and so on. And also people are 
appealed to work at company X or Y because this 
company is this or that. In this perspective, an 
organization is understood as a ‘whole’ where workers 
substantially identify themselves with, with mission 
statements, the specific company cultures, or 
whatever. To be part of the whole would imply to 
identify you with it, to embody it and to become as one 
with the organization. Individual and collective are thus 
pinned down to a substantial criterion, an essence, a 
strong and steady ‘self’.  
When identity is understood as a permanent given 
or essence then every characteristic referring to 
something else, something from outside, is then 
identified as a threat, as a sort of virus contaminating 
the pure identity of the organizations identity or image 
(Boyd, 2000). For an organization then, the individual 
subject is a strange entity it has to ‘adapt’ in order to 
make it functional for the organization. As an individual, 
you will become one of them if you start working there; 
we all know that sort of expensive slogans.  
To refer again to Kafka: in this story, the company 
then represents the five friends and we are the sixth 
but contrary to Kafka’s story, 5+ 1= 5 here; we may 
enter into the house as long we reduce ourselves to a 
part of the whole.  
Thinking an organization from the perspective of 
singularity means that we no longer think in terms of an 
unchangeable essence (Ten Bos, 2005). Nancy’s 
notion of the singular goes the other way round: 
organizations are able to function because they differ 
from themselves and change all the time. The 
revolutionary about that is of course not the idea that 
we change all the time; in particular in business we 
always demand for changes. This is not Nancy’s point, 
nor is he dreaming of a postmodern ontological 
conundrum that renders everything the same, that 
makes every truth merely relative and that leads us to 
believe that the world is too complex to be known.  
Of greater innovative relevance is the idea that not 
only with every new employee, an organization’s 
identity has changed, but also that the singular identity 
of all employees is changing all the time. The 
organization is but its components with their singular 
traits at that very moment and these traits produce a 
singularized and thus necessarily temporary collective.  
This seems superficial but it implies a lot. As long as 
we start from identity as a substantial given, an 
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unfruitful opposition is at work: the collective, the 
organization, is seen as the enemy of the subject and 
vice versa. From this perspective, individuals should 
adapt to enter the identity and if not, they remain an 
intruder, an outsider or if we would moralize them, they 
become stubborn employees who refuse to adapt their 
behavior to the company. 
Nancy’s notion of singularity on the contrary, does 
not start from an opposition of two identities but from 
identities differing from themselves because they are 
understood as singular, changing entities and precisely 
their singular characteristics at that very moment will 
potentially modify the whole as such (Pryor, 2004). 
Consequently, an organization has all reasons to face 
the question of singularity. For instance a typical 
argument from a loyal worker who is asked to move to 
another working place is: ‘I like it here, I don’t want to 
move’. This answer is in a sense very substantial: the 
employee supposes that working culture, work floor 
organization, and so on will stay the same during his or 
her whole career and that is why s/he does not want to 
leave. But those are conditions s/he can of course 
never be sure of.  
The singularized answer would be more something 
like that: I like it ‘here and now’. Because so many 
aspects and evolutions can impact on the job, it can be 
completely changed within even the shortest of 
periods. Organizations are not always places of 
stability. The reasons the employee offers when he 
refuses to go may not be available after change has set 
in: a new boss, a new colleague, other tasks to be 
carried out, a new owner of the organization, anything 
can happen. Within every change in conditions, we can 
potentially speak of a new constellation or 
singularization of the relation between the organization 
and the employee. The classic relation between them, 
often premised on concepts such as job security or 
lifelong loyalty, does no longer exist. Neither can we 
still speak of a relation between the whole and its parts, 
between the collective and its individual members. 
What makes of an organization each time again a 
singularized entity? It are the temporary and unique 
constellations, based on the way employees behave, 
the policy of the organization, the traffic, the mood of 
the people at that very moment, the outside 
temperature, the loss of Manchester United the 
evening before in the Champions League, the whatever 
and many other aspects. 
Traditionally, an organization tries to suppress all 
these temporary influences of their employees and of 
the environment or society in general. An organization 
does not want the employee to malfunction because of 
the loss of Manchester United. It wants him or her to do 
the job, quite irrespective of whatever emotional state 
the employee is in. And the more structured and 
planned the acts of the employees are (do this, then 
this, …), the less singularity can play its role. As such 
this is a pity because one can also, besides the evident 
counterarguments, reveal many opportunities here 
where an organization could function better if it would 
be interested in singularity. It is in this prospect that we 
want to tackle the importance of care in an 
organization.  
5. TAKING CARE 
What we are suggesting here is not some sort of a 
critique of business ethics or of caring organizations, 
but rather as an attempt to open up a space of thinking 
before it gets closed by some ethical image we all have 
to expose because it is fashionable to call yourself a 
caring organization. Taking care of people is the core 
business of a caring organization and this has to be 
more than window dressing.  
Ethics has to do with right procedures but is so 
much more. To give a very extreme example: we don’t 
think that taking care of a warm cell and fancy clothes 
in Guantanamo after you were waterboarding a 
prisoner, is an ethical practice; foreclosing 
Guantanamo, that would be a truly ethical act. As such, 
the use of the word ‘ethics’ is no guarantee for an 
ethical practice.  
Our distrust with the widespread use of ethics was 
and is based upon the speed by which the word all of a 
sudden had become fashionable. When and because 
words become well-known, no one still questions their 
meaning for the simple reason that because they are 
well known; it would be embarrassing not to know its 
meaning. So instead of asking what the word means, 
one decides to pretend as if one knows what it means 
by saying, ‘ethics?’, of course we agree.  
Consequently, in dealing with ethical topics we have 
to be aware of that. As philosophers as Martin 
Heidegger and Jacques Derrida have demonstrated, 
the way we question something always already 
determines our answer to the problem (Derrida, 1997b; 
Martin Heidegger & Macquarrie, 1962). If we ask 
ourselves, how can we develop procedures to take 
care of people, we presuppose that taking care can be 
settled with right procedures. This is a matter of 
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distrusting yourself at the very moment you think you’re 
doing the right thing.  
If we distrust ourselves in the context of a caring 
organization, the toughest question is to ask ourselves: 
does care only start at the very moment we are posing 
this question, or are we already put into a caring 
relationship towards the world and the others before we 
start to develop procedures, formats and baselines do 
deal with it? Is a caring organization something we can 
organize or does the care include a responsibility which 
precedes our initiative to care? We think this would be 
Nancy’s question. Let us return a final time to his 
writings to unravel this.  
In The Experience of Freedom, Nancy states that 
justice today can no longer be that of a right 
environment presupposing a given measure (J. L. 
Nancy, 1993). By this, he refers to the ontological order 
of an (ancient) world that gave a central function to the 
idea of a just measure. Unlike the antique or feudal 
order in which the structure of the world is given to 
man, a modern society starts from the idea that there is 
no presupposed order or measure in the world. With 
the withdrawal of God in the modern era as the 
founding principle of the universe, creation is thrown 
back increasingly on itself, Nancy writes in his essay 
‘Human excess’ (J.-L. Nancy & Richardson, 2000, pp. 
177-183). Lacking any criterion or limit point, it 
becomes its own measure.  
This is what we appreciate at most of modernity: as 
human beings, we can do what we want. We are who 
we want to be. And indeed, metaphysically speaking, 
never before our freedom was so radical. But as is 
often the case, there is also a reverse side of this 
freedom. If anyone but man is left to cope with our 
freedom, there is nothing to fall back upon. If we can do 
what we want, there is also no escape from it. 
Consequently, to do what one wants turns into ‘we 
have to do what we want’. Once the Gods have flown 
away, we cannot escape from the fact that we are free 
and we are the only ones to take up the challenge.  
This is why Nancy confronts us with a quite 
annoying question: If the just measure has collapsed, 
does it not mean that we are the only ones left to be 
responsible for the world? But how to understand our 
responsibility? If the world is measuring itself, if ‘man’ is 
the measure of all things, we acquire an immense 
responsibility for the whole of existence. In The 
Experience of Freedom, Nancy describes this ‘total 
responsibility’ and in ‘Responding for existence’ he 
calls it an archi-responsibility (J. L. Nancy, 1999b). By 
this, he understands the fact that our responsibility 
does not stem from a just measure or from a self that is 
responsible only for its own legal obligations. Archi-
responsibility precedes all measures and laws. This 
does not imply that one always and for all time has to 
bear an unlimited responsibility, or that political or 
moral, juridical responsibility is not to be assessed in 
concrete situations. This assessment is also a 
responsibility but once the measure for it is no longer 
given in advance, all assessment of responsibility 
always and already starts from this archi-responsibility. 
Archi-responsibility is a responsibility ‘before’ 
responsibility. It means that in Nancy’s philosophy, 
responsibility is something that precedes our initiative 
to be responsible, it is not an option but something we 
are always thrown into. To be responsible, Nancy 
writes, is not to expel yourself from this condition (J. L. 
Nancy, 1999b). As Heidegger already stated, because 
we are thrown into the world, we have the possibility of 
regarding this ‘thrownness’ as our own and of deciding 
to take our existence in our own hands (Martin 
Heidegger & Macquarrie, 1962). To Nancy, the fact that 
something in existence precedes our own initiative is 
crucial. It is only because man is understood as a free 
agency, we are able to take responsibility in the most 
literal sense of the word: the Latin words ‘respondere’ 
and ‘res-pondeo’ contain ‘res’ and ‘sponsio’. ‘Res’ 
stands for thing, matter, while ‘sponsio’ means a 
religious or judicial engagement – think about the 
English word ‘spouse’ or the French ‘épouse’. 
'Respondere’ or ‘spondere’ mean ‘answer to’ or 
‘promise in return’; to respond was also part of the 
Christian liturgy said or sung by the congregation in 
reply to the priest (J. L. Nancy, 2001). 
To respond therefore means to encounter, to 
answer a promise, to get engaged in something coming 
from elsewhere; which implies responsibility is always a 
matter of more than one individual enclosed upon itself 
(See also: Altman, 2007). To be responsible is to 
answer an engagement or an appeal, to be opened 
towards the outside, towards others and to take part of 
the world. Dictionaries mention that only from the 
second half of nineteenth century, responsibility 
involves obligations or duties as we understand them 
today. Earlier on, it was a word to express the 
capability of answering, to get engaged in a social 
relationship so to say (Brown, 1993). Therefore, Nancy 
writes, in the original sense, to be responsible is to be 
engaged towards others.  
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6. CONCLUSION  
What kind of conclusions can we deduce from 
Nancy’s work? Of course, it is always hard to make the 
transition from a practical balancing of how to organize 
things with this kind of fundamental, ontological 
thought. To understand what Nancy is up to, it is crucial 
to go back to the basic questions: how do we think 
about identity, about an organisation and how do we 
understand care? It is obvious that Nancy tries to tell us 
something at this very fundamental level.  
First of all, Nancy can make us aware that being 
responsible or taking care is not only something you 
can manage. In the context of the caring organization, 
it implies a lot. Taking care is not only a problem of 
daily management but also of thinking about how we 
understand human identity, how we conceive an 
organization as a collective identity, et cetera. Often, 
we start from very substantial ideas in this context: an 
organization stands for X, a person stands for Y and 
the main problem of management is how can we make 
them work together, be it in a context of care or not. 
One can with concepts such as singularity think of a job 
or an organization in far less substantial ways. Every 
one of us has periods in his life where he is creative 
and happy or when is in an emotional crises or suffers 
from a complete burn-out. When people have to do the 
same job during their whole life in the same way, one 
loses at lot. With some flexibility and the suitable 
incentives, one can stimulate employees in creative 
periods to fulfill other tasks, to work at other places in 
the factory, or to allow for the possibility to have people 
formulate novel ideas concerning the organization of 
their factory. In busy periods for employees (e.g. the 
nursing of little children at home), one can foresee the 
time and the place to step back for a period, be it part 
time, be it with let them fulfilling other tasks, and so 
forth. There are endless possibilities here. During 
certain periods, an organization needs more creativity, 
working hours or new ideas than during other periods 
of relative stability. Why not try to match these periods 
with the impulses coming from people working for the 
organization? 
Maybe singularity can play a certain role in 
processes of organizational change and resist the idea 
that it should be suppressed at all cost in organizational 
settings. Why should not an employee or a manager 
learn to think in terms of jobs they can do rather than in 
terms of jobs they have to do? The more working 
places are organized in a bureaucratic and ‘neurotic’ 
way, the less they give singularity the space to develop 
the opportunities it can offer. 
Of course singularity is not a magic formula that will 
somehow reorganize our whole society. Far from that. 
If it has a function to fulfill, that is to say, if we can allow 
it to happen – and this is what is at stake in Nancy’s 
writing – it seems to play a rather ‘modest’ role. You 
cannot change an organization by the whim of a 
manager or the smile of a girl. But singularity does 
happen, also in organizations, and it has perhaps some 
potentiality to bring in new and creative ideas on law, 
work, labor, culture, and so on. To allow it to happen 
rather than merely resisting it requires a rethinking of 
many of our frameworks that determine our views on 
work and organizations in general: the part-whole 
thinking or the substantial views on identities of 
subjects in general, and the emphasis on strong 
organizational cultures are only a few of them. A lot of 
thinking awaits us here, be it with or without Nancy, 
Borges or Kafka.  
Secondly, the matter of responsibility. For sure, it is 
necessary to manage care and the problems we are 
facing with. But it can also be very useful and even 
necessary to be aware of responsibility which does not 
start nor end with the right procedures we develop for 
this (See also: Decoste & Boyd, 2009). Responsibility 
means more than that. If Nancy writes we must do 
justice to existence, by that he never means thé 
existence as such but always singular existences to 
which we do justice (or not). In being responsible, we 
are not talking to history but to peoplewho are not 
simply migrants, or workers, or whoever, but singular 
identities. Maybe our responsibility is also to be 
creative in thinking how to respond to the sixth person 
in Kafka’s story. It is easy to exclude him and to say: 
sorry, the door is closed. In an organization, we never 
know what the next day will bring us: maybe we will 
need a sixth one. Although today he can be disturbing, 
tomorrow he may be very interesting.  
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